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This Article adds a new dimension to the most important and influential 
strand of recent constitutional theory:  popular or democratic 
constitutionalism, the investigation into how the U.S. Constitution is 
interpreted (1) as a set of defining national commitments and practices, not 
necessarily anchored in the text of the document, and (2) by citizens and 
elected politicians outside the judiciary.  Wide-ranging and ground-
breaking scholarship in this area has neglected the role of the President as 
a popular constitutional interpreter, articulating and revising normative 
accounts of the nation that interact dynamically with citizens’ constitutional 
understandings.  This Article sets out a “grammar” of presidential popular 
constitutionalism, lays out the historical development and major 
transformations in its practice, proposes a set of thematic alternatives for 
today’s presidential popular constitutionalism, and locates presidential 
popular constitutionalism within the larger concerns of constitutional 
theory.  In particular, it argues that some of the major political 
developments of recent decades, such as the “Reagan revolution” and the 
Clinton-Bush era, can be fully understood only by grasping that they are 
episodes in presidential popular constitutionalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidents interpret the U.S. Constitution.  They do so outside the text of 
the document and beyond the separation-of-powers questions that inhere in 
executive practice.  They submit normative visions of the national 
community to the public as bases for claims to legitimacy.  This practice is 
not “mere rhetoric” in the sense of being insubstantial, ephemeral, or 
entirely instrumental.  It has a grammar, a persistent structure that defines 
the kinds of appeals Presidents can make in this register.  It also has a 
history:  epochs and themes in which certain kinds of constitutional 
arguments predominate and others recede into weakness or invisibility.  
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This Article analyzes the genre and the grammar of “presidential popular 
constitutionalism” and sets out its eras, particularly those of the twentieth 
century.  Besides contributing to a theoretical and historical understanding 
of this kind of presidential speech in general, it provides a frame for 
appreciating the stakes of presidential rhetoric in the elections of 2008. 
If one theme distinguishes the past decade of constitutional scholarship, it 
is that “the Constitution” is more than that document’s text, and that its cast 
of interpreters runs well beyond the hierarchy of judges that culminates in 
the Supreme Court of the United States.  Scholars have emphasized that the 
Constitution forms the touchstone of an ethos, a normative vision of 
national community, shaped out of ideas such as liberty and equality, but 
only loosely rooted in the constitutional text itself.1  They have explored the 
ways in which legislative and popular disputes over the basic principles of 
national community help to give this ethos its content.2  They have also 
identified ways in which these practices of “popular constitutionalism” 
interact with judicial interpretation, as judges address themselves to 
constitutional politics and respond to that politics in opinions.3 
The last decade’s events have also brought fresh attention to the role of 
the executive branch as a constitutional interpreter.  New claims of 
presidential authority in the years since September 11, 2001, have 
 
 1. See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS:  DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A 
COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS:  THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002); ROBIN 
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:  RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (2001); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Jack M. Balkin, Respect-
Worthy:  Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 485 (2004); 
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); Frank I. 
Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social Citizenship:  A 
Comment on Forbath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, 
Originalism as a Political Practice:  The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
545 (2006) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Originalism]; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular 
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004) 
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe 
Rage:  Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007) 
[hereinafter Post & Siegel, Roe Rage]; Douglas Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:  Toward a 
Theory of State Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); Ernest A. Young, 
The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007). 
 2. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 255–344 
(1998); POWELL, supra note 1; WHITTINGTON, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Originalism, 
supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Roe 
Rage, supra note 1; James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 
(1997) [hereinafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution]; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause:  Labor and the Shaping of American 
Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Pope, Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause]. 
 3. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2; POST, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, 
Originalism, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Roe Rage, supra note 1; Reed, supra note 1. 
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highlighted the importance of the executive branch as an interpreter of the 
separation of powers.4  This scholarship has dovetailed with a broader 
revival of recognition that the executive branch has long maintained its own 
practice of constitutional interpretation.5  Another important strand in this 
development is Bruce Ackerman’s studies of presidential leadership as 
critical to twentieth century “constitutional amendments” outside the 
Article V process.6 
Serious debates have arisen around all these lines of work.  Both 
descriptive and normative claims about executive interpretation are as 
contested as one would expect of any complex and high-stakes legal 
dispute.7  On the popular constitutionalism front, critics have charged that 
popular interpretation contradicts the very idea of a constitution, indeed of 
rule of law, by denying the fixity and finality of basic principles.8  The 
disputes have highlighted a range of positions that sometimes run together 
under the “popular constitutionalism” rubric.  Some claim that final 
interpretive authority has always belonged to the mobilized people, and that 
assigning it instead to a judicial mandarinate is itself anticonstitutional.9  
The people, outside the process, have the final word.  Others do not 
collapse constitutional law into politics, but try to reconstitute the law-
politics distinction with a large place for popular mobilization in defining 
each epoch’s iteration of law.10  Still others give neither politics nor judging 
the final say, but understand their topic to be the interplay of democratic 
self-rule and judicial interpretation, two distinct and ultimately 
irreconcilable principles that interact uneasily but fruitfully in American 
constitutionalism.11 
This Article is agnostic toward such basic jurisprudential questions, 
although agnosticism tends inevitably toward the last position surveyed, 
which is itself a variant of agnosticism.  Its intent is to set out the grammar 
and historical epochs of presidential popular constitutionalism, then suggest 
 
 4. See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE:  THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2008); Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2006); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power:  Presidential 
Influence on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, 
Putting Separation of Powers into Practice:  Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41 (2007). 
 5. See generally POWELL, supra note 1; Barron & Lederman, supra note 4; Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:  Who Determines 
Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105; Neil Kinkopf, 
Foreword, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 1. 
 6. See ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
 7. See, e.g., YOO, supra note 4; Barron & Lederman, supra note 4. 
 8. See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, supra note 1. 
 9. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1. 
 10. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
 11. See, e.g., POST, supra note 1; POWELL, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Originalism, 
supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 1; Post & Siegel, Roe 
Rage, supra note 1. 
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what appreciating this form of constitutional speech might mean for 
theoretical understandings of constitutionalism more generally. 
In Part I, the Article sets out a grammar of presidential popular 
constitutionalism.  Rhetoric in this vein does three things:  it sets out a 
normative social vision of the national community, provides a picture of the 
dignity or purpose that membership in the community lends Americans, and 
derives from these an account of the scope and purpose of legitimate 
American government.  This part also makes the case for concentrating on 
inaugural addresses as exemplars of presidential popular constitutionalism, 
explaining that these speeches have always occupied a special place as 
expositions of basic principles and interpretations of the national 
community. 
Part II traces the historical development of presidential popular 
constitutionalism, explaining how it has fallen into two distinct epochs in 
which the inaugural address occupied different genres:  a nineteenth-
century version tied to libertarian basic rights and a broadly republican 
vision of the country, in which the President’s authority was tied directly to 
constitutional principles, and a twentieth-century version, in which 
Presidents have taken their legitimacy from a special role as interpreters and 
articulators of electoral events and popular will.  Within the second epoch, 
several rhetorical periods have brought distinctive accounts of national 
community, civic dignity, and legitimate government.  A Progressive 
version, which identified a strong state as the only counterpower that could 
protect vulnerable individuals against complex social and economic 
systems, was preeminent between the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson and 
Richard Nixon.  This version was not homogenous, but included a variety 
of distinct ways of accounting for civic dignity in an activist state.  In part 
because of the failure of these efforts, a libertarian version, with a much 
more restricted view of government, succeeded them and was in turn 
succeeded by a communitarian normative social vision, exemplified in both 
Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  The communitarian rhetoric, which 
frames today’s presidential speech, lacks a strong account of legitimate 
government.  These transformations have not been happenstance or purely 
driven by exogenous forces:  they have reflected both imperatives and 
developments within the rhetorical tradition of presidential popular 
constitutionalism and efforts by Presidents within that tradition to deal with 
and make sense of such developments. 
Part III sets out the thematic and conceptual alternatives that now 
confront any effort to revive a more robust account of government’s scope 
and purpose within a presidential constitutional vision, noting the 
prominence of individualism, consumerism, diversity, and markets as deep 
and persistent facts in contemporary American life. 
Part IV returns to the themes of the Introduction, drawing out the 
implications for constitutional thought of recognizing the importance of 
presidential popular constitutionalism.   
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I.  THE GRAMMAR OF PRESIDENTIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The approach of this Article is to attend thoroughly to presidential 
popular constitutionalism itself and then try to understand its significance 
for constitutional thought more generally, rather than shoehorn it into the 
finer points of a standing debate.  Nonetheless, it is worth setting out the 
basic theoretical grammar of such speech before getting into particulars.  In 
specifying this grammar, this Article inevitably interprets the speech itself 
and, at the same time, invokes a set of interpretive presuppositions.  In the 
interest of transparency, it is important to say that the picture of grammar 
set out here emerged from a process of reflective equilibrium.  On the one 
hand, a careful reading of past presidential speech, particularly inaugural 
addresses, revealed a pattern of persistent themes that seemed to define the 
task that Presidents set for themselves in addressing the public.  On the 
other hand, these themes suggested the value of certain theoretical 
approaches, which in turn informed my later readings of the same 
addresses. 
A.  The Work of Presidential Language 
Major presidential addresses, particularly inaugural addresses, seek to 
establish presidential authority or legitimacy.  Authority is more than the 
fact of having the power to accomplish one’s ends:  it is specifically 
normative, concerned with the rightness of exercising that power.  If there is 
a difference between authority and legitimacy, it is subtle and nonobvious.  
Legitimacy may imply a formal or objective quality, a condition of public 
acts that arises from their being taken in the right manner and by the right 
actors.  Authority is perhaps more imbued with the subjective experience of 
the one who takes the command, in the case of the democratic political 
authority, the experience of members of the public.12  Authority might be 
described as legitimacy felt and tasted.  Less metaphorically, a President 
has authority when it is widely felt that he has the right to act and 
command.13 
 
 12. I would not want to make too much of the contrast between authority and legitimacy.  
The two are different inflections of essentially the same concern:  the normative status of 
power within a political community.  Jeffrey Tulis prefers to write of “legitimacy,” and his 
classic study, The Rhetorical Presidency, is as close to the concerns of this Article as any 
work I have identified. See JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 14 (1987) 
(“Political rhetoric is, simultaneously, a practical result of basic doctrines of governance, and 
an avenue to the meaning of alternative constitutional understandings.”). 
 13. As presidential historical and political scientist Stephen Skowronek puts it, 
Authority . . . [in contrast to power] reaches to the expectations that surround the 
exercise of power at a particular moment, to perceptions of what is appropriate for 
a given president to do.  A president’s authority hinges on the warrants that can be 
drawn from the moment at hand to justify action and secure the legitimacy of the 
changes effected. 
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:  LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO 
BILL CLINTON 18 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
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Presidential popular constitutionalism seeks to generate authority by 
evoking a normative image of the national community.  This image is a 
hybrid creation of fact and value:  it at once describes life in the American 
polity and assesses the life it describes as good or bad, worthy or unworthy, 
fixing cardinal points of pride, disappointment, and aspiration.  It is, as 
Charles Taylor writes in defining a “social imaginary[,] . . . that common 
understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared 
sense of legitimacy.”14  When such a normative image takes hold, it is not 
an abstract theory of either social activity or legitimacy, but something at 
once deeper and less articulate:  a field of presuppositions about how the 
world works and what most matters in it, which form the mostly unspoken 
backdrop to experience.  Presidential popular constitutionalism both 
invokes and tries to shape this field of experience, what Woodrow Wilson 
in his first inaugural address called “a vision . . . of our life as a whole. . . . 
[T]he bad with the good, the debased and decadent with the sound and 
vital,” a key to history and touchstone for approaching “new affairs.”15 
One critical way in which such a normative image of the national 
community works is by addressing citizens’ need for dignity.16  This quality 
involves having a place to stand in one’s own social world, esteem in 
others’ eyes which reinforces self-regard.  One theorist, Axel Honneth, 
distinguishes usefully between respect and recognition, with respect 
referring to a polity’s assignment of formal rights and immunities, 
recognition to the social honoring of more subtle and particular qualities, 
those aspects of identity that are specific to one’s own group or 
personality.17  A group of legal scholars led by Dan Kahan has focused on a 
concept closely related to recognition—how competing normative images 
of national community distribute status among social groups.18  However 
one chooses to map its facets, dignity in presidential popular 
constitutionalism bridges civic identity and personal identity more 
generally.  Presidential speech aims to specify what bases of dignity 
political membership adds to nonpolitical identity. 
These three aspects of rhetorical grammar—authority, the normative 
image of the country, and civic dignity—stand in no unique deductive 
relationship to one another.  Rather, they interact to produce either 
 
 14. CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23 (2004). 
 15. President Woodrow Wilson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1913). 
 16. For a valuable discussion of the development of this idea in modern life and thought, 
see CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
(1992). 
 17. See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION:  THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF 
SOCIAL CONFLICTS 131–40, 145–79 (1995). See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, 
MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” (1992). 
 18. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 
(2007); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan, The Logic of 
Reciprocity]; Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy:  A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein 
on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (book review). 
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coherence or dissonance, with any one supporting others that are consonant 
with it.19 
B.  The Special Place of Inaugural Addresses 
The inaugural address falls at a pivotal moment, when the energy and 
animus of the presidential campaign have begun to drain away and the 
President takes on a different kind of persuasion:  not reinforcing the 
loyalty of partisan supporters, but convincing voters who lost, who may 
have spent the past year mistrusting or even disdaining him, why he 
deserves a share of their loyalty.20  Presidents have always marked the day 
as a turn from partisan to national identity, since Thomas Jefferson declared 
at the end of a bitter campaign, “We are all Republicans, we are all 
Federalists.”21 
There is a second and more basic reason to focus on the inaugural 
address.  Jeffrey Tulis, the foremost historian of presidential rhetoric, has 
pointed out that the inaugural address has been the centerpiece of two 
epochs (one comprising a pair of subepochs) of presidential constitutional 
interpretation.  Throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of 
the twentieth, each inaugural address was an “attempt to articulate the 
president’s understanding of republican principle,” the organizing ideals of 
the American constitutional community.22  From Thomas Jefferson through 
Abraham Lincoln, the addresses were fundamentally exercises in this 
register of constitutional interpretation, tending to derive their policy 
prescriptions, such as they were, from those principles.23  After the Civil 
War, “the form of address was reversed” and Presidents set out 
constitutional principles in defense of the policy commitments of their 
parties.24  In both cases, however, a vision of republican political 
community was the organizing concern of the address, making it a 
centerpiece of presidential constitutional interpretation.  As we shall see in 
more depth, Woodrow Wilson used his first inaugural address to revise the 
convention of the form, linking the President’s interpretive authority less to 
the text and ethos of the Constitution than to the democratic activity of the 
electorate, and thus deepening the sense in which the address engaged in 
popular constitutional interpretation.25 
Inaugural addresses, then, form a genre-specific time-slice of presidential 
popular constitutionalism as old as the Constitution itself.  Tracing their 
development provides a map of continuity and change along the thread of a 
 
 19. This nondeductive, coherence-seeking relationship might be conceived in terms of 
John Rawls’s famous idea of reflective equilibrium. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
42–45 (rev. ed. 1999). See generally HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE 
DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002). 
 20. See TULIS, supra note 12, at 47–51. 
 21. President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801). 
 22. See TULIS, supra note 12, at 50. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 117–37. 
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single theme:  the shape and meaning of American constitutional 
community, as interpreted by the President. 
II.  THE EPOCHS OF PRESIDENTIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A.  Freedom, Dignity, and Presidential Language in the Nineteenth Century 
The predominant nineteenth-century vision of the presidency did not yet 
make room for innovative engagement with the normative image of 
national life.  In sharp contrast to the President’s twentieth-century role as a 
visionary “interpreter” of collective experience, nineteenth-century 
Presidents labored under severe suspicion of “demagoguery,” a pejorative 
that might attach to any direct appeal to popular will or sentiment.26  The 
independence of the office did not yet rest, as it would in the twentieth 
century, on the idea that the President had a direct electoral and rhetorical 
connection to popular will.27  Instead, presidential independence was 
derived from the constitutional status of the office, an intermediate and 
limiting, rather than an immediate and empowering, connection to 
democratic will.28  Nineteenth-century Presidents tended to present 
themselves in the manner of Supreme Court Justices, as nonpartisan 
exegetes of permanent constitutional principle, rather than proponents of 
ascendant constitutional visions.29 
Nonetheless, from Thomas Jefferson through William McKinley, a 
coherent constitutional vision animated the nineteenth century’s presidential 
language.  Its normative social image was of a continent of plenty, 
inhabited by men (there was only one gender in this epoch of presidential 
constitutionalism) who were fully capable of mastering their own affairs 
and shaping their own lives.  It was what Jefferson, in his first inaugural 
address, called “a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to 
the thousandth and thousandth generation.”30  By chosen he meant not 
divinely ordained, but that Americans had chosen their country by 
occupying North America and creating a nation out of revolution and 
constitutional politics.  Westward expansion would enable them to inhabit 
free, self-governing communities deep into the future.31  There would be no 
need for the hierarchy and dependence of feudal orders, where men, 
crowded together in old countries, rested their wealth and freedom on the 
abjection of others.32  This image of American life had a profound affinity 
with the social vision of free labor, the idea of a country of proprietors who 
 
 26. See id. at 27–33. 
 27. See id. at 33–45, 124–32. 
 28. See id. at 33–45. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Jefferson, supra note 21. 
 31. See ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY:  AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM AND THE 
EMPIRE OF RIGHT 3–27 (1995). 
 32. See id. 
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freely arranged their affairs to the growing prosperity of all.33  Merging the 
antimonopolist populism of Andrew Jackson and other Jeffersonians with 
the antislavery ideology of Northern Republicans, free labor became the 
defining picture of the United States after the Civil War.34  Uniting all these 
inflections of the idea was the normative social vision that Jefferson 
articulated:  a continent of plenty inhabited by men who were, jointly and 
singly, the masters of their fates. 
In this constitutional vision, the authority of government was clear, 
essential, and circumscribed.  As Jefferson put it in his first inaugural, “[A] 
wise and frugal Government . . . shall restrain men from injuring one 
another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of 
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the 
bread it has earned.  This is the sum of good government.”35  He envisioned, 
that is, a constitutional scheme of negative liberty, securing citizens from 
violence and theft and otherwise leaving them to order their own lives.  
Jefferson’s embrace of negative liberty arose from an image of the positive 
powers of individuals engaged in “industry and improvement” to “regulate 
their own pursuits” without impeding one another’s freedom and to make a 
good living by their labor.36  This version of negative liberty begins not in 
abstract principles, but rather in a picture of the social lives of Americans in 
a continent of plenty. 
Expanding on the “essential principles” of American constitutionalism, 
Jefferson hewed to negative liberty and self-restraint by government, 
augmented by the political-economy insight that economic expansion 
would require public spending on infrastructure.  The principles were 
“[e]qual and exact justice to all men,” regular elections and majority rule, 
economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly bur[d]ened . . . 
encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the 
diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the 
public reason; freedom of religion; freedom of the press, and freedom of 
person under the protection of the habeas corpus, and trial by juries 
impartially selected.37 
These were principles of constitutional authority for a nation of the upright 
and strong, people able to take advantage of economic opportunity and 
apply reason, judgment, and energy to give their lives the shape they 
sought. 
Here the normative social vision and the account of constitutional 
authority meet in a picture of dignity.  The main source of personal dignity 
in this vision was being the kind of American whose power of self-
 
 33. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 1–37 (1970) (describing the premises and social 
vision of free-labor thought). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Jefferson, supra note 21 (emphasis added). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
PURDY FOR BP 3/2/2009  7:02:06 AM 
2009] PRESIDENTIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 1847 
authorship Jefferson’s principles honored.  In this vision, a part of the 
specifically civic dimension of dignity is simple recognition:  membership 
in a polity that honors each white, male, potentially property-holding citizen 
as master of his own life, standing foursquare with all others.  This was an 
important part of what Jefferson and others meant when they called the 
United States “republican.”38 
A second meaning of “republican,” and another source of civic dignity, 
was the idea that each American had an equal part in forming the 
sovereignty of the United States—the body of political power.  The idea 
that power flowed from the whole political community to the government, 
which held it in “trust,” was central to American political language in the 
nineteenth century.39  Presidents contrasted this republican idea of 
sovereignty with the monarchical vision of political power as descending 
from the king.  Thus, speaking in the register of civic dignity, Franklin 
Pierce held that any American citizen could “stand unabashed even in the 
presence of princes, with a proud consciousness that he is himself one of a 
nation of sovereigns.”40  Defending the principle of universal male suffrage 
even for uneducated former slaves, James Garfield put the republican-
monarchical contrast even more starkly:  “If in other lands it be high treason 
to compass the death of the king, it shall be counted no less a crime here to 
strangle our sovereign power and stifle its voice” by suppressing the vote.41  
In this image, the least able and most scorned citizen claimed the same 
sovereign dignity as a European ruler. 
There was always a large element of myth in the social vision of free 
labor, but there was reality, too, in the plentiful opportunity of a continent 
opened for settlement in a time when land was the source of most wealth.  
That continent, however, changed in the nineteenth century.  The Industrial 
Revolution moved production from farms and workshops, which laborers 
could hope to acquire for themselves, to factories, which they could not.  
The national economy overwhelmed local markets and produced 
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PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1–7 (1997) (setting out an 
American version of “republican” liberty); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:  A THEORY OF 
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 1–128 (1997) (describing the historical development and 
conceptual commitments of republicanism). 
 39. On the origins of this idea, see Jedediah Purdy & Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, 
Trustees, Guardians:  Private-Law Concepts and the Limits of Legitimate State Power, LAW. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2007, at 165, 173–80.  For presidential uses of the concept, 
see, for example, President James Madison, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809) 
[hereinafter Madison, First Inaugural] (referring to his “awful sense of the trust to be 
assumed”); President James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1813) (invoking 
“the momentous period at which the trust has been renewed”); President James Monroe, 
First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817) (referring to the need for a President to hold “a just 
estimate of the importance of the trust and of the nature and extent of its duties”); id. 
(referring to American government officials as “the faithful and able depositaries of their 
trust [of the American people]”); President Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
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semimonopolist trusts, which regulated their industries in their own favor.  
In the face of these realities, free-labor thought came to seem more 
complacent than dignifying.  Its principle of negative liberty came to imply 
that workers and other less wealthy groups could not use politics to change 
the balance of economic power, in a time when economic life seemed, to 
many, more a constraint than a source of empowerment. 
Grover Cleveland expressed this principle of noninterference at the close 
of the nineteenth century, denouncing political intervention in economic life 
as “paternalism. . . . [T]he bane of republican institutions.”42  Paternalism, 
Cleveland insisted, 
perverts the patriotic sentiments of our countrymen and tempts them to 
pitiful calculation of . . . sordid gain[s]. . . . It undermines the self-reliance 
of our people and substitutes in its place dependence upon governmental 
favoritism.  It . . . stupefies every ennobling trait of American citizenship. 
 . . . [W]hile the people should patriotically cheerfully support their 
Government[,] its functions do not include the support of the people.43 
When a President could denounce minimum-wage and maximum-hours 
laws as threats to civic dignity, equating a sometimes brutal industrial 
economy with Jefferson’s open frontier, free labor was near exhaustion.  
Whatever the experience of earlier generations had actually been, now 
workers, farmers, and some small businessmen began to feel that they were 
not at all the masters of their own destinies, but playthings of complex 
systems that they could only partly understand, let alone change.44 
These changing realities interacted with changing ideas to challenge the 
individualistic constitutional vision of free labor.  A generation of 
Progressive elites studied economics and politics at German universities 
and returned with images of a nation as an organic whole, like a living 
body, in which the national spirit or character must be deeply entwined with 
both political and economic institutions.45  They tended to deplore the 
political economy of early American republicanism as illusory atomism, a 
false image of society as an assembly of “sovereigns” rather than the 
complex organism they believed it really was.46 
B.  Wilson’s Interpretive Turn and the Challenge of Progressive Dignity 
Both practical and intellectual discontent with free-labor language 
reached the center of national politics with the presidencies of Theodore 
 
 42. President Grover Cleveland, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893). 
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AGE 52–111 (1998). 
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Roosevelt and, above all, Woodrow Wilson.  Wilson accomplished two 
transformations, the first in the President’s role as constitutional interpreter, 
the second in the substance of constitutional vision. 
The first of Wilson’s changes was to replace the nineteenth-century 
image of the President as vessel of a timeless and prepolitical constitution 
with a twentieth-century picture of the President as the unique voice of 
democratic self-rule, interpreter-in-chief of the electoral tumult that carried 
him into office.47  Striking a new note in inaugural language, Wilson in 
1913 offered “to interpret the occasion” and argued that the Democratic 
victory mattered not for the sake of the party, but because “the Nation 
[sought] to use the Democratic Party. . . . to interpret a change in its own 
plans and point of view.”48  Wilson’s description of the role was romantic 
and visionary.  The President was to be a kind of democratic oracle, tasked 
with giving voice to the people’s power to redefine public life through 
democratic action—a power which, he implied, would remain mute unless 
it found its presidential voice.  He proposed that the last election had 
brought “a new insight into our own life. . . . a vision . . . of our life as a 
whole,” and called the challenge of the time “whether we be able to 
understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their 
spokesmen and interpreters.”49 
Wilson not only pioneered this form of rhetoric, but also helped to create 
the political practices in which it could flourish, that of the President talking 
politics directly to the electorate.  He broke with convention in campaigning 
extensively in his first presidential run, reaching over the heads of 
Democratic party bosses to establish an immediate rhetorical link with 
voters.50  In his presidency, he emphasized the spoken word in other 
respects, notably reviving the oral State of the Union address, which since 
Thomas Jefferson’s presidency had been delivered to Congress in written 
form.51  A new rhetorical form required not just a register of language, but a 
practice that constituted a stage and audience.  Wilson substantially created 
each of these. 
Wilson’s second great change was in the substance of constitutional 
vision.  He brought to the presidency a Progressive vision of social life that 
was, in critical respects, the opposite of the free-labor picture of individual 
self-mastery.  Wilson instead described Americans—“men and women and 
children,” the first appearance of citizens other than adult males in an 
inaugural address—as profoundly vulnerable to “the consequences of great 
industrial and social processes which they can not alter, control, or singly 
cope with.”52  The normative social vision of the nineteenth century was of 
limitless individual mastery in a continent of plenty; the twentieth century 
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opened with a new image of the individual overmastered by forces beyond 
his, or her, power and comprehension.  This social picture became a 
premise for Wilson’s successors.  In 1937, Franklin Roosevelt reported that 
“the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization. . . . without the aid of 
government had left us baffled and bewildered.”53  Nearly thirty years later, 
Lyndon Johnson described “a world where change and growth seem to 
tower beyond the control and even the judgment of men.”54 
This social vision brought a new justification for government, a new 
register of authority.  The state was now the only power large and 
concentrated enough to master the “great industrial and social processes” 
that would otherwise master citizens.55  Americans needed the state to 
perform precisely those functions that Cleveland had denounced as 
“paternalism”:  rearranging economic life to make it less merciless, more 
egalitarian, richer in opportunity even for those of limited luck or uneven 
gifts.56  Government was required to fulfill an almost parental duty to 
succor to the needy and fragile bodies of its people.  Wilson argued, 
“[t]here can be no equality or opportunity, the first essential of justice in the 
body politic, if men and women and children be not shielded in their lives, 
their very vitality,” from the “great . . . processes” that impinged on them.57  
In the same inaugural address in which he declared individuals baffled by 
the problem of a complex civilization, Franklin Roosevelt announced a new 
purpose for government:  “to solve for the individual” precisely those 
problems.58 
Wilson’s changes brought a problem.  How did the new image of 
Americans as vulnerable individuals, watched over by a powerful state, 
connect with any sensation of personal dignity?  Nineteenth-century civic 
dignity rested foremost on the vision of a nation of autonomous individuals, 
and secondly on the idea that each citizen formed an equal part of the 
nation’s sovereignty.  The normative social vision that Wilson advanced 
repudiated this idea and rested a new account of the authority of 
government on that repudiation:  government’s role was to step in and 
reshape economic life precisely where individuals were vulnerable and 
unable to shape their own lives by the free-labor script.  The widespread 
(though not universal) progressive commitment to an organic, evolutionary 
view of society further undercut the idea of a nation as a sovereign, built out 
of the original sovereignty of each member—the republican idea that Pierce 
and Garfield had voiced.  Being the socially vulnerable object of the state’s 
solicitude was not the basis of dignity that the nineteenth-century ideas had 
been. 
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C.  The Progressive Search for Civic Dignity 
Seizing on the presidential role that Wilson created—that of interpreter-
in-chief of a changing constitutional vision—Presidents throughout the 
twentieth century tried to articulate a progressive vision of civic dignity.  
The following four approaches to this task are ideal types, made up of 
elements that overlapped in practice.  Nonetheless, they emerge from a 
survey of twentieth-century presidential speech as the landmarks of a 
decades-long effort to reconcile a new social vision with the persistent 
demand for a language of civic dignity. 
1.  Vision 
One approach to the problem of civic dignity was to portray the nation as 
a single personality, which had fallen into confusion or failed to realize its 
full potential, but was now approaching a new wholeness that would bring 
moral as well as material greatness.  In this line of rhetoric, citizens were 
supposed to be elevated just by recognizing their connection with this 
improving whole.  In his first inaugural, Wilson described Americans as 
holding “a vision . . . vouchsafed us of our life as a whole.”59  He lamented 
the self-confident individualism of free labor as a period of callowness and 
callousness, which brought forward “something crude and heartless . . . in 
our haste to succeed and be great.”60  Under his presidency, Wilson 
declared, the aim would be to overcome these deficiencies in character, “to 
cleanse, to reconsider, to restore[,] . . . to purify and humanize every 
process of our common life without weakening or sentimentalizing it.”61  
Emphasizing the new and distinct qualities of this image of politics, Wilson 
called the work ahead “no mere task of politics but a task which shall search 
us through and through,” not a merely practical enterprise but a challenge at 
the level of identity.62  In his second inaugural, he pressed further these 
images of spiritual and psychological insight, identifying authenticity as the 
standard for the country’s self-transformation through politics:  “The 
shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled, and we 
shall walk with the light all about us if we be but true to ourselves . . . .”63 
Wilson’s visionary language was something new.  No previous President 
had based his claim to govern or his version of civic dignity on a national 
personality in which each citizen participated.  Wilson’s debt to the organic 
image of society which some Progressives borrowed from European social 
thought is evident here, as is the influence of Romanticism:  Walt Whitman, 
that touchstone of American Romanticism, had warned a half century 
earlier that the national spirit was in decline and required new interpreters, 
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poets, and literati to renew it.64  Franklin Roosevelt, who was in many ways 
a successor to Wilson, would later pick up this imagery, describing the 
country as having, like a person, a mind, body, and spirit, of which the 
spirit—its animating values—was the most precious and essential.65 
2.  Mobilization 
Franklin Roosevelt was the leading rhetorician of a second approach to 
civic dignity:  the language of mobilization, in which politics and social 
reform figured as what William James had called “the moral equivalent of 
war.”66  In this imagery, collective action imparts clear purposes, dramatic 
effect, and intense solidarity, all more charismatic and dignifying than the 
scattered acts of individuals.  Roosevelt announced in his first inaugural 
that 
if we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing 
to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline, because without such 
discipline no progress is made, no leadership becomes effective.  We are, 
I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such 
discipline, because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger 
good. . . . 
 I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people 
dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems.67 
The dignity that mobilization offered rested in “the warm courage of 
national unity[,] . . . clear consciousness of seeking old and precious moral 
values,” and “clean satisfaction that comes from the stern performance of 
duty by old and young alike.”68  This lucid, vigorous, and effective action 
required a leader to provide command and coherence—a military version of 
Wilson’s interpreter-in-chief.69  Thus the American people proved their 
vitality, in Roosevelt’s account, when they “asked for discipline and 
direction under leadership” and “made [him] the present instrument of their 
wishes.”70 
These two rhetorical approaches shared a difficulty.  If the nation were 
united in one purpose, shared in the spirit and action of all its members, that 
might indeed recapture the old spirit of mastery, with a tincture of Romantic 
authenticity.  Assigning that spirit to the whole country, however, could 
mean sacrificing it in the individuals who formed the nation.  Securing the 
lives and property of individuals against such “discipline,” as Roosevelt 
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warmly offered, had been the touchstone of the free-labor image of civic 
dignity.71  That image had rested on the idea that Americans could organize 
their individual and common lives around rights of life and property 
without favoritism, paternalism, or, worst of all, outright incursion on those 
rights.  Those inviolable rights were the anchor of the self-mastery that 
animated nineteenth-century civic dignity.  In Roosevelt’s language, the 
same rights became objects of sacrifice to a national purpose set out by a 
charismatic leader.  This was, perhaps, too sharp a break from the main 
chords of American civic dignity to that time. 
3.  Ecological Enablement 
Franklin Roosevelt also pioneered a third Progressive approach to civic 
dignity, which did not repudiate the free-labor idea but tried to adapt it to a 
new era.  In this register, Roosevelt did not present the expanding 
Progressive state as the antithesis of self-reliant individualism; instead, he 
described his government as the only power that could secure those old 
values in new times.  In a 1932 address to San Francisco’s Commonwealth 
Club, Roosevelt identified two perennial American rights, the first being 
free conscience and judgment, and the second being protection of 
property.72  Free conscience, he claimed, was unchanged since the time of 
Jefferson, whom Roosevelt evoked as his model.73  Property rights, 
however, had changed in the industrial age.  The point of property rights, 
Roosevelt argued, was to enjoy personal security:  assurance against 
starvation, sickness, and old age, and a place to stand in the world.74  In the 
twentieth century, that security was not as simple as it had (Roosevelt 
maintained) been on the frontier.  Roosevelt called “the highly centralized 
economic system . . . the despot of the twentieth century, on whom great 
masses of individuals relied for their safety and their livelihood, and whose 
irresponsibility and greed (if it were not controlled) would reduce them to 
starvation and penury.”75 
Roosevelt’s image depended on moving civic dignity up by one level of 
abstraction, from the rights that had secured it in the free-labor scheme to 
the conditions the rights were meant to maintain:  autonomy and freedom 
from domination.  In a changed world, Roosevelt argued, those conditions 
might require legal instruments, the opposite of those that had preserved it 
in an earlier time.  At one time, firm property rights had helped to free men 
and women from monarchical tyranny, feudal privilege, and enslavement, 
the defining enemies of free labor.76  Now, however, a complex economy, 
built from those same property rights, created not security, but insecurity, 
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the vulnerability to “great social and economic forces” that Wilson had 
evoked.77  The solution was to revise and abridge those rights to create new 
sources of economic security and opportunity.78  According to Roosevelt, 
this was not an anti-individualist position:  it was only a way of doing for 
industrial self-reliance what simpler economic arrangements had done in 
the agrarian age.  Twentieth-century Americans needed “a more 
permanently safe order of things. . . . not to hamper individualism, but to 
protect it.”79  What was required was creating the institutional conditions in 
which individuals could freely flourish, the aim that this Article calls 
“ecological enablement.” 
Lyndon Johnson later extended Roosevelt’s idea in a description of his 
“Great Society,” now often remembered as a half-failed war on poverty, but 
intended as a new vision of democratic life in an affluent age.  He portrayed 
that society as one of ceaseless self-discovery and self-creation, “not . . . the 
ordered, changeless, and sterile battalion of the ants. . . . [but] the 
excitement of becoming—always becoming, trying, probing, falling, 
resting, and trying again—but always trying and always gaining.”80  
Roosevelt had described the founding spirit of the United States as the 
power to begin the world anew in one’s own life, and had called that spirit 
the engine of democracy throughout history.81  Johnson rendered this ideal 
as an individual goal made possible by an ecology of laws and institutions, 
forming a humanist paradise 
where leisure is a welcome chance to build and reflect, not a feared cause 
of boredom and restlessness. . . . where the city of man serves not only the 
needs of the body and demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and 
the hunger for community. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of 
our labor.82 
4.  Constitutional Faith 
The languages of vision and mobilization made little room for 
individuality in their imagery of the individual absorbed into a coherent 
national movement.  The language of ecological enablement was strongly 
individualist in its core values, but presented individuality as a social 
product, a creature of laws and institutions that tamed and shaped a 
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complex economy.  A somewhat different register of civic dignity is that of 
constitutional faith.  This language eschews the organicist and collectivist 
impulses of much of the Progressive language from the first half of the 
twentieth century, but, unlike the rhetoric of ecological enablement, 
envisions civic identity as essentially connected with shared values. 
The language of the civil rights era has been the twentieth century’s 
defining expression of constitutional faith.  In his major addresses on civil 
rights, Lyndon Johnson expressed the elements of this idea.83  The country 
is tied by its founding and subsequent transformations to a creed of equal 
individual freedom and dignity.84  These define an ideal constitutional 
community of mutual respect among citizens.85  This ideal illuminates a 
history of failure and disappointment as much as success, and marks the 
present as an imperfect achievement.86  It also provides a compass for the 
present, an image of the country to steer by.87  In the language of 
constitutional faith, repudiating an earlier version of national life is not 
simple rejection, but a crooked road to consummation:  rejecting a cramped 
vision of the country is a step toward entering a larger one.88 
This language has a good deal in common with the first register of civic 
dignity, the language of vision.  It does not, however, rely on the image of 
the country as a single organism or personality; nor, for that matter, does it 
require the collective and concerted action that animates the language of 
mobilization.  It is democratic in relying less on a commander- or 
interpreter-in-chief than the language of Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt did.  
Its core is the individual citizen’s relationship to a tradition of civic 
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ambition, the wish to take some of one’s own dignity by contributing to a 
polity of equal dignity.  Its faith—the reason to give it that term—is that 
breaking with the past and disrupting the present are not acts of betrayal, 
but ways of making good on a commitment that is partly inherited, but 
necessarily reinterpreted in each generation and, even, each individual. 
D.   The Turn Away from Progressive Constitutionalism:                      
Nixon Through Reagan 
1.  Nixon’s Departures 
This sometimes awkward, always experimental language was all along 
vulnerable to rejection in favor of a more familiar register of dignity:  the 
idea that men and women were inherently the masters of their own lives, 
government was mainly a threat to their mastery, and there was no need for 
a new formula of civic dignity.  These ideas, the heart of the nineteenth-
century presidential formula, reentered the center of political language with 
Nixon’s presidency.  Nixon was in many respects tied to the mid-century 
consensus that a powerful government was necessary in modern conditions, 
a conviction that united Democrats such as Harry Truman and Republicans 
such as Dwight Eisenhower.89  Nixon, however, faced a distinctive set of 
political pressures:  he had to answer attacks on government from the New 
Right of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan and the anti-integrationist 
populism of George C. Wallace.90  He was, moreover, a man with a finely 
developed sense of resentment, able to register the ways that others felt 
hemmed in and disrespected—as he did himself, even as President—and 
translate those into political rhetoric.91  This blend of political strategy and 
personal temperament opened up several paths in Nixon’s language.  He 
first brought to presidential speech the theme that the most important values 
are private and personal, and stand in contrast to government, rather than 
enabled by it as Johnson envisioned.  He moved toward locating civic 
dignity in the private virtue of personal responsibility.  His first inaugural, 
in 1969, was also the first to use responsibility in a private sense which, as 
we shall see, became a touchstone of presidential speech in later decades.  
Nixon argued that national greatness rested above all on “those small, 
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 91. See id. at 68–71 (on Nixon’s temperament and its role in shaping conservative 
language and ideas in the 1960s and 1970s). 
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splendid efforts that make headlines in the neighborhood newspaper instead 
of the national journal.”92  Four years later, he pressed the theme further: 
 A person can be expected to act responsibly only if he has 
responsibility. . . . Let us locate responsibility in more places.  Let us 
measure what we will do for others by what they will do for 
themselves. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Let us remember that America was built . . . not by welfare, but by 
work—not by shirking responsibility, but by seeking responsibility.93 
Private virtue, particularly “responsibility,” was Nixon’s counterpoint to 
“government” and the Progressive welfare state, here represented by the 
“welfare” that did not build America.  It was a major theme of both Nixon’s 
inaugurals, especially the second, that Americans had asked too much of 
government and not enough of one another and themselves.  Nixon self-
consciously echoed one of John F. Kennedy’s most famous lines, to very 
different, entirely private-regarding effect:  “let each of us ask—not just 
what will government do for me, but what can I do for myself?”94 
2.  Reagan’s Break 
Nixon’s language was inconsistent, lurching between mid-century pieties 
on the importance of government and fierce slashes at paternalism.  Ronald 
Reagan brought force and clarity to these themes, reasserting the 
nineteenth-century version of civic dignity and rejecting outright the 
normative social vision and theory of legitimacy that Wilson had 
introduced.  In this way he brought to an end what might be called the short 
twentieth century of presidential popular constitutionalism. 
In his first inaugural, Reagan rejected the centerpiece of the Progressives’ 
normative social vision:  the idea that personal mastery in modern 
conditions requires strong government.  Referring to recession and growing 
deficits (which would increase greatly under his administration), he 
declared, “In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our 
problem.”95  He went on, “From time to time, we’ve been tempted to 
believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, 
that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of 
the people.”96  While Reagan ran together several targets in this sentence, 
his overarching aim was to attack the presumption that complex, impersonal 
systems outstripped individual will and understanding, a belief that 
Presidents from Woodrow Wilson through Jimmy Carter had mostly 
accepted.  Reagan responded that this was nonsense:  the Progressive social 
 
 92. Nixon, supra note 89. 
 93. President Richard Nixon, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1973). 
 94. Id. 
 95. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981). 
 96. Id. 
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vision was simply wrong.  If it fell, the Progressive theory of legitimacy—
that government is necessary to master otherwise overwhelming social 
forces—fell with it.  Indeed, in a highly effective rhetorical reversal, 
Reagan provided an alternative explanation for any feeling Americans 
might have that they were not the authors of their own fates:  “[O]ur present 
troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in 
our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of 
government.”97  Reclaiming lost or compromised mastery, then, required 
disciplining government and, ultimately, getting it out of the way. 
Reagan remained firmly within Woodrow Wilson’s redefinition of 
presidential rhetoric even as he broke decisively with the substance of 
Wilson’s constitutional vision.  He presented himself as very much the 
master-interpreter of American political experience, but turned that role to 
reviving much the same constitutional vision that Wilson and his allies had 
denounced.  Reagan’s revived constitutional vision focused on that old 
register of civic dignity, the inherent power of men (and now women) to 
author their own lives.  He described the twentieth century as marked by 
capitulation to growing government, which went hand in hand with failing 
will and self-confidence.  The end of the decline came in 1980, when “we 
knew it was time to renew our faith, to strive with all our strength toward 
the ultimate in individual freedom, consistent with an orderly society.”98  In 
defining where this optimal balance lay, Reagan sounded a libertarian chord 
of personal dignity as strong as anything free-labor ideology had ever 
offered:  “There are no limits to growth and human progress when men and 
women are free to follow their dreams.”99  Citizenship, moreover, required 
self-confidence above all, “our willingness to believe in ourselves and to 
believe in our capacity to perform great deeds.”100  In the substance of his 
constitutionalism, then, Reagan offered a libertarian normative social 
vision, in which men and women are naturally the authors of their own lives 
and fates; a picture of government authority anchored in the nineteenth-
century imperative to honor that inherent self-mastery and avoid setting 
impediments in its path; and an image of civic dignity centered, like that of 
free labor, on being in fact the author of one’s own life and part of a polity 
that honors that power in its members.  The break with the constitutional 
vision that reined between 1917 and 1973 was complete. 
E.  Constitutionalism Without Politics:  The Bushes and Clinton 
The two decades of presidential rhetoric since the end of Ronald 
Reagan’s second term express the struggle to fill out a constitutional vision 
on the landscape Reagan created:  one in which government operates under 
strong suspicion of incompetence, if not malign design, and personal 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. President Ronald Reagan, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 1985). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Reagan, supra note 95. 
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dignity is very much a quality of the individual, not a condition of the social 
or political order.  Accordingly, since the election of George H. W. Bush in 
1988, the normative social vision of American Presidents has scarcely been 
political at all.  Across party lines, in a time of venomous partisan animus, 
the last three Presidents have consistently concentrated on personal virtue, 
qualities that uphold families, workplaces, and civic groups.  Although the 
kind of political rhetoric has deep historical roots, it is new in important 
ways.  Its central ideas—character, responsibility, and service—have never 
before figured so prominently, or in such intensely nonpolitical ways, as 
they do now. 
This rhetoric is particularly pronounced in the presidencies of Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush.  Imagine reading these Presidents’ major 
addresses as a visitor from another century, unfamiliar with local partisan 
cues such as the allegiances of teachers’ unions.  Some difference in 
religious language would be apparent, although only a matter of degree:  
God figures in the critical passages of Clinton’s speeches and throughout 
Bush’s.101  Otherwise, the overriding impression would be of a culture of 
profound moral consensus, where the same central terms anchored both 
parties’ rhetoric. 
Responsibility is a keystone word for both Clinton and Bush.  Clinton in 
his first inaugural defined “what America does best:  offer more opportunity 
to all and demand more responsibility from all.”102  He declared it time “to 
break the bad habit of expecting something for nothing from our 
Government or from each other,” and time for “all [to] take more 
responsibility not only for ourselves and our families but for our 
communities and our country.”103  Four years later, he announced that “we 
need a new sense of responsibility for a new century” and, again, that 
“every one of us, in our own way, must assume personal responsibility not 
only for ourselves and our families but for our neighbors and our 
Nation.”104  George W. Bush dedicated his 2000 Republican Party 
nomination address to the theme of responsibility, urging a “responsibility 
era.”105  In his first inaugural, he called America “at its best . . . a place 
where personal responsibility is valued and expected.”106  He celebrated 
responsibility as “a call to conscience” which, although “it requires 
 
 101. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005) 
(“From the day of our founding, we have proclaimed that every man and woman on this 
Earth has rights and dignity and matchless value because they bear the image of the Maker 
of heaven and Earth.”); President William Jefferson Clinton, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 
20, 1993) (“The Scripture says, ‘And let us not be weary in well doing:  for in due season we 
shall reap, if we faint not.’ . . . And now, each in our own way and with God’s help, we must 
answer the call.”). 
 102. Clinton, supra note 101. 
 103. Id. 
 104. President William Jefferson Clinton, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1997). 
 105. Governor George W. Bush, Nomination Acceptance Speech at Republican National 
Convention (Aug. 3, 2000). 
 106. President George W. Bush, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2001). 
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sacrifice,” brings people into “the fullness of life not only in options but in 
commitments.”107 
Service, too, is central in both Presidents’ language.  In his first inaugural 
address, Clinton “challenge[d] a new generation of young Americans to a 
season of service,” called “serving” the key to the “simple but powerful 
truth [that w]e need each other,” and declared, “From this joyful 
mountaintop of celebration we hear a call to service in the valley.”108  In 
2001, explaining that “[w]hat you do is as important as anything 
government does,” Bush urged citizens “to serve your nation, beginning 
with your neighbor” and “build[] communities of service and a nation of 
character.”109 
Character is another defining word in this lexicon.  In an alliterative 
catalogue of personal virtues, Bush in 2001 called for “a new commitment 
to live out our nation’s promise through civility, courage, compassion and 
character.”110  Four years later, he argued that 
 [i]n America’s ideal of freedom, the public interest depends on private 
character—on integrity and tolerance toward others and the rule of 
conscience in our own lives.  Self-government relies, in the end, on the 
governing of the self.  That edifice of character is built in families, 
supported by communities with standards, and sustained in our national 
life by the truths of Sinai, the Sermon on the Mount, the words of the 
Koran, and the varied faiths of our people.111 
Clinton did not rely in the same way on the word character, but he did 
declare in 1997 that “the greatest progress we have made and the greatest 
progress we have yet to make, is in the human heart.  In the end, all the 
world’s wealth and a thousand armies are no match for the strength and 
decency of the human spirit.”112 
This constellation of virtues is essentially about people’s ineradicable ties 
to others—in a word, interdependence.  Interdependence is the key to the 
normative social vision that both Presidents present, and it unites their 
language across partisan differences.  While Clinton announced the “simple 
but powerful truth [that w]e need each other, and we must care for one 
another[,]”113 Bush explained that “the exercise of rights is ennobled by 
service . . . . [because l]iberty for all does not mean independence from one 
another.”114  In keeping with that emphasis, this political language also 
leans heavily on community and communities, not as mere descriptions, but 
as moral terms for groups of people who recognize their interdependence 
and responsibility of service to one another.  Character, similarly, is not 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Clinton, supra note 101. 
 109. Bush, supra note 106. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Bush, supra note 101. 
 112. Clinton, supra note 104. 
 113. Clinton, supra note 101. 
 114. Bush, supra note 101. 
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only a descriptive term but a moral designation of the qualities of 
responsibility and service that preserve community. 
This presidential language is surprisingly new.  To be sure, George 
Washington maintained that a country’s political institutions depend 
ultimately on the virtue of its people,115 but for roughly the first two 
centuries of American independence, presidential constitutionalism 
concentrated on specifically political ideas.  Character was a description of 
personality or outlook, not a moral term, while virtue, its obvious cognate, 
tended to mean such political virtues as love of liberty and respect for rule 
of law.116  Responsibility and service overwhelmingly referred to the duties 
of public office, usually the presidency itself.117  Community was a neutral 
noun rather than a moral concept:  it designated communities of interest, 
political jurisdictions, and the international community of civilized 
nations.118 
 
 115. See President George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 30, 1789) (“[T]he 
foundations of our National policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of 
private morality.”). 
 116. See, e.g., President Grover Cleveland, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893) 
(warning against policy that “saps the strength and sturdiness of our national character”); 
President William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841) [hereinafter W. H. 
Harrison, Inaugural] (referring to a love of power as anathema to the “character of a devoted 
republican patriot”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1877) 
(describing civil-service reform as ensuring that an occupant of certain positions should keep 
his job “as long as his personal character remain[s] untarnished”); President Andrew 
Jackson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1833) (asserting that successful foreign policy 
“has elevated our character among the nations of the earth”); President Thomas Jefferson, 
Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805) (referring to the “reflecting character of our 
citizens at large” in considering public affairs and the “zeal and wisdom of the characters” 
whom they elect); Johnson, supra note 54 (“Our destiny in the midst of change will rest on 
the unchanged character of our people and on their faith.”); President James Monroe, First 
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817) (“We must support our rights or lose our character”); 
Washington, supra note 115 (referring to “[s]ervice of my Country” as military and political 
service). 
 117. See, e.g., President John Quincy Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1825) (referring 
to his ensuing presidential term  as “my public service”); President Grover Cleveland, First 
Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1885) (referring to his “solemn sense of responsibility” upon 
assuming the presidency); President Warren Harding, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921) 
(using “universal service” to refer literally to draft enlistment); President John F. Kennedy, 
Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961) (identifying the “call to service” with American soldiers 
buried abroad); Madison, supra note 39 (referring to “the honor and the responsibility 
allotted to me”); President James K. Polk, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1845) (insisting that 
the President, in executing his office, “shrinks from no proper responsibility”); Wilson, 
supra note 63 (referring to “an America united in feeling, in purpose and in its vision of 
duty, of opportunity and of service”).  It is worth noting that service does get an early use in 
something close to its contemporary sense, although with a more civic inflection than is 
typical now. 
 118. See, e.g., President John Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1797) (referring, in a 
discussion of republican political culture, to the “general dissemination of knowledge and 
virtue” as the test of such a government); President Benjamin Harrison, Inaugural Address 
(Mar. 4, 1889) (referring to “virtues of courage and patriotism”); W. H. Harrison, Inaugural, 
supra note 116 (referring to love of country and of liberty as “public virtue”); Monroe, supra 
note 116 (proposing to maintain the near perfection of American government by “preserving 
the virtue and enlightening the minds” of citizens).  The first hint of a contemporary sense of 
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What accounts for the moralization of these terms and their new 
centrality to political language?  Perhaps, without the Progressive 
normative social vision that defined much of twentieth-century presidential 
rhetoric, Presidents struggled to find a language that could uphold both a 
new normative social vision and a sense of civic dignity within it.  The 
paradoxical evacuation of government from constitutional vision, which 
Nixon began and Reagan completed, is the shared premise of the rhetorical 
register that we are now examining.  Bill Clinton’s language of service and 
responsibility was an effort at working out the idea that, while government 
was not the source of all problems, “[g]overnment is not the solution.  
We—the American people—we are the solution.”119  The language of 
personal and social virtue addressed the “work that government alone 
cannot do” and “the bad habit of expecting something for nothing from our 
Government or from each other.”120  Indeed, Clinton’s insistence on the 
limits of government was louder than George W. Bush’s, perhaps because 
he was pressing against the mid-century stereotype of the big-government 
liberal, while Bush did not labor under that shadow.  In George W. Bush’s 
speeches, it has not been necessary to contrast private virtue with statist 
ambition because grand visions of government’s role are so clearly finished 
as anchors for presidential constitutionalism.  The divorce of civic identity 
from government, which Nixon set in motion, is nearly complete in Bush’s 
speeches. 
Instead, as noted, the normative social vision of this presidential rhetoric 
centers on interdependence.  Its version of civic dignity arises from filling 
out the moral demands of interdependence:  responsibility, service, 
character, and loyalty to community.  In this vision, circles of moral 
obligation move outward from the family through church, friendship, and 
other concrete forms of moral community.  The only political quality in this 
speech, however, is that the speaker occupies the country’s most powerful 
and visible political office.  It speaks to people as moral and social beings, 
but not as citizens, unless citizen means simply a person who is aware of 
interdependence and takes it seriously.  This last point is particularly 
important:  no clear theory of legitimacy, of presidential and governmental 
role, emerges in this political language.  Government is the slightly shamed 
moral underling of private virtue.  As in the nineteenth-century language of 
free labor, the President’s role is partly to recognize and honor the moral 
authority of individual virtue.  Without the special role that laissez-faire 
individual rights played in the free-labor vision, however, today’s language 
lacks even a precise if minimalist libertarian view of the state.  It is instead 
a kind of notional communitarianism, with little that is specific to say about 
 
“community” is Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “virtues most cherished by free people—love of 
truth, pride of work, devotion to country,” which he held out as bases of civic dignity. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1953).  The word does 
not appear in inaugural addresses thereafter. 
 119. Clinton, supra note 104. 
 120. Clinton, supra note 101; Clinton, supra note 104. 
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the legitimate use of political power, or even the specifically political 
aspects of a dignifying civic identity. 
This is the situation in which the 2008 presidential race engaged the 
question of whether rhetoric matters and, if so, what self-understanding a 
President should help the country to achieve.  Having brought the story to 
its present moment, this Article now turns to the alternatives at issue today 
in presidential popular constitutionalism. 
III.  TODAY’S ALTERNATIVES 
This Article has diagnosed poverty in today’s dominant register of 
presidential popular constitutionalism.  Most markedly, the normative 
social vision and the image of civic dignity do not add up to a robust—or 
even, perhaps, a realistic—account of legitimacy.  As noted earlier, a time-
traveling visitor might judge from today’s presidential rhetoric that she had 
encountered a culture of profound moral consensus.  She might also 
conclude that she had found a culture with no idea what to do with its 
government. 
In considering the resources for those who might wish to develop a new 
or renewed presidential constitutionalism, this analysis of the last two 
centuries suggests a few fixed points, which any constitutional vision likely 
must take into account, and some choices that will represent important 
alternatives. 
A.  Some Fixed Points 
For one thing, any constitutional vision will likely have to accept some of 
the personal-virtue consensus that unites Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.  
The emphasis on private life and personal-scale interdependence reflects a 
strong tropism to concreteness:  Americans experience freedom, purpose, 
and satisfaction most strongly and distinctly in family and individual life.121  
These are archetypes for understanding what it means to be connected with 
others and have commitments beyond ourselves.122  We have not so much 
“mystic chords of memory”123 as felt inhabited bonds with others whom we 
have seen healthy and sick, elated and sad, and at all hours of day and night.  
It is not just that these are what we live for, though that is often true, but 
that they are how we know what it means to live for something, rather than 
just to exist.124  Recent Presidents’ choice of these rhetorical anchors 
reflects an apt perception of their importance:  the problem is that, in 
 
 121. See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 228–322 (1998).  For a vivid, if 
somewhat less sympathetic image of the concreteness and immediacy of American moral 
life, see ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:  INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 3–26 (1985) (describing archetypal Americans and their 
organizing values). 
 122. See WOLFE, supra note 121, at 228–322. 
 123. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861). 
 124. See WOLFE, supra note 121, at 228–322. 
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themselves, they provide little link outward to a political register of 
constitutional vision. 
Any constitutional vision will also have to acknowledge that much of the 
dignity of self-mastery now resides in purely private life, serviced by 
consumer sectors specializing in experience and self-transformation.  The 
search for a fuller life, and a life more fully one’s own, is the engine of the 
pharmaceutical industry, lifestyle magazines, psychotherapy, mega-
churches, and health clubs, to name just a few examples.125  These are not 
ersatz, but as real and concrete as the forms of personal interdependence 
that stand stead for political community.  Like those forms of 
interdependence, these pursuits tend to remove anything distinctly political, 
even anything distinctly civic, from the time-honored pursuit of self-
authorship.  They nonetheless represent real achievements in self-creation 
and self-revision, and there is no reason to expect or wish that their role in 
defining personal dignity would diminish. 
Finally, any constitutional vision that looks back to Progressive 
antecedents will have to address a country that is more diverse and, in 
important ways, equal, than any previous version of the United States.  The 
New Deal, the greatest American political experiment in social solidarity, 
addressed a national community with white-supremacist struts.126  The part 
of Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” that is now most widely remembered, 
the “War on Poverty,” had real failings, but it was also broken on racial 
resentment, precisely because Johnson would not limit its reach along the 
racial lines that Roosevelt accepted.  As political scientist Robert Putnam 
has documented, decades of growing diversity, tolerance, and openness 
have made the country at once more humane and more nearly a nation of 
strangers.127  Although, as Putnam also argues, there is no reason in 
principle to deny that diversity and solidarity can exist together, it is also 
true that, so far, they lack a convincing register for coexistence in American 
politics. 
B.  Alternative I:  Dependence or Mastery 
The idea that each American is the author of her own life, constrained 
only by her talent and energy, implies a social world of open opportunity, 
where anyone might become anything.  Some two-thirds of Americans say 
that skill and effort, rather than luck or social conditions, determine where a 
 
 125. For a discussion of these dimensions of consumer culture and community life more 
generally, and an argument about their significance for the prospects of political culture, see 
TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH:  FROM THE DEATH OF 
ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY 188–215 (2007). 
 126. On the role of race in early-twentieth-century reform, see MORTON KELLER, 
REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY:  PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, 
at 251–81 (1994). 
 127. See generally Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum:  Diversity and Community in the 
Twenty-First Century:  The 2006 Johann Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 
137 (2007). 
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person ends up in life; that is twice the share of Europeans who say so.128  
Demonstrating their confidence in the upward mobility that this social 
vision implies, fully thirty-nine percent of Americans say that they either 
are or will soon be in the country’s wealthiest one percent.129  This 
optimism, however, is linked to a merciless judgment:  whoever cannot pull 
off success bears the full burden of her failure.  Abraham Lincoln, no 
apologist for inequality but a deeply convinced free-labor politician, neatly 
combined these two aspects of the idea of self-mastery when he declared 
that, because the American market economy provided everyone an 
opportunity for dignity and equal standing, “If any continue through life in 
the condition of the hired laborer [rather than become a landowner and 
employer of others], it is not the fault of the system, but because of either a 
dependent nature which prefers it, or improvidence, folly, or singular 
misfortune.”130 
Wilson and his successors rejected this conclusion as the sign of an 
inadequate constitutional vision.  As we have seen, their answer was 
frequently to deny the fact of self-mastery that was essential to the 
nineteenth-century normative social vision, asserting a Progressive 
countervision of vulnerability and dependence.  That, in turn, was the vision 
that Ronald Reagan triumphantly dispatched. 
The Progressive vision struggled to find a register of civic dignity as 
compelling as the idea of self-mastery.  The vision that has replaced it has 
little account of the terms and purposes of legitimate government.  The 
question, then, is whether this opposition is unavoidable or, alternatively, if 
there is a way to anchor a robust account of legitimate government in a 
vision of self-mastery.  If there is, it seems likely to be a version of 
ecological enablement:  the idea that self-authorship is a worthy ideal, but 
requires a strong set of public institutions to make it real. 
A contemporary version of ecological enablement might involve a 
gamble on this proposition:  that it was not the idea that failed, but its deep 
implication in a web of bureaucratic institutions that came to seem 
anticharismatic and ineffective.131  Reclaiming that idea, then, would mean 
building institutions to promote equal opportunity—the premise of the 
image of self-mastery—that have the virtues of nimbleness, efficiency, and 
individuation widely associated with (if not always present in) markets.  
 
 128. See ANDREW KOHUT & BRUCE STOKES, AMERICA AGAINST THE WORLD 53–54 (2006) 
(reporting that two in three Americans reject the idea that success is determined by factors 
outside the individual’s control, compared with forty-eight percent of Britons and thirty-one 
percent of Germans). 
 129. See David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Triumph of Hope over Self-Interest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2003, at WK15. 
 130. President Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural 
Society (Sept. 30, 1859). 
 131. See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 95 (“We are a nation that has a government—not the 
other way around. . . . [I]t is time to check and reverse the growth of government, which 
shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed. . . . [O]ur present troubles 
parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from 
unnecessary and excessive growth of government.”). 
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From citizen-based public health insurance to market-modeled income 
supports, there are many proposals to combine Progressive ends with 
market means.132  The contribution here is to understand that these might 
form parts of a constitutional vision with the potential to combine elements 
that are often opposed:  the ideal of self-mastery and the Progressive social 
vision of vulnerable individuals in complex systems.  An updated, market-
oriented set of social supports would not so much combat those systems 
with the counterpower of government, as the old Progressives imagined, as 
it would re-engineer the system itself to promote equal opportunity. 
C.  Alternative II:  Private Life as Buying In or Opting Out 
As noted, the central place of private life in the contemporary moral 
vision is quite basic.  That said, however, there are competing versions of 
the moral significance of private life and of its potential for integration into 
a constitutional vision.  The privatized, quasicommunitarian language that 
George W. Bush and Bill Clinton share exemplifies one version.  In this 
approach, the moral drama of private life is the steady, not always 
successful effort to behave properly, connect with others, and maintain the 
basic commitments of one’s family and institutional roles.  In this version, 
these personal and social virtues are the struts of all common life and the 
anchor of dignity for those who cultivate them. 
Another version of private life is, so to speak, more “Californian”:  the 
ideal of private life as self-improvement, self-discovery, and self-invention, 
which a wealthy and free society makes possible.  This is the ideal that 
Lyndon Johnson evoked when he described the “Great Society” as marked 
by “the excitement of becoming—always becoming, trying, probing, 
falling, resting, and trying again.”133  The first ideal conjures up the life of 
family dinner tables, religious meetings, and community service:  a life of 
continuity and interdependence.  The second calls up a world of change:  
entrepreneurship, emotional insight, a move to a region or religion or 
relationship, not adrift but steering toward greater clarity and self-
realization. 
In addition to their other differences, each version of private life has 
distinct potential to fit into a less privatized constitutional vision.  In either 
case, the aim would be to understand private life less in contrast or 
opposition to public life than as unavoidably complementary—taking place 
in dynamic interaction with public institutions and principles, which both 
create the concrete circumstances of private life and impart some of the 
identity that people inhabit within it.  For the Bush-Clinton version of 
private life, this would mean deepening the ideal of reciprocity among 
citizens, taking seriously the idea, often glimpsed in those Presidents’ 
addresses, that civic responsibility is as essential as the personal and social 
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sorts.134  For what this Article called a moment ago the “Californian” 
version of private life, the hook would likely be something nearer the ideal 
of ecological enablement that was evoked but never achieved in connection 
with the Great Society. 
Such rhetorical achievements could not likely survive as rhetoric alone.  
Their most forceful expression would come in association with programs 
that instantiated their visions as concrete experience.  For ecological 
enablement, as mentioned earlier, this might mean opportunity-creating and 
social-protection programs compatible with a cultural premium on 
flexibility and individuation.  For the personal-virtue approach to private 
life, it might take the form of a national-service program linked to benefits 
such as a “social inheritance” or “stakeholder” grant, connecting the 
hallmarks of social and economic self-reliance with the civic reciprocity of 
service.135 
IV.  LESSONS FROM PRESIDENTIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A.  Public Policy and Constitutional Vision 
Possibilities for public-policy reform interact dynamically with 
developments in constitutional vision.  As Jeffrey Tulis points out, the 
inaugural address has always been a defense of a President’s and a party’s 
public-policy vision; it has also, in a series of registers, been an articulation 
of constitutional vision.  In this, it is a microcosm of presidential leadership. 
Presidential popular constitutionalism creates the field of presuppositions 
in which one public-policy agenda or another becomes plausible, powerful, 
or nearly inevitable.  Its normative social vision frames problems and their 
possible solutions.  Under the strong free-labor vision, the economic 
arrangements of the nineteenth century seemed a self-authorizing marriage 
of freedom and self-interest, state intervention, and the selfish and sapping 
“paternalism” that Cleveland denounced.136  Under Wilson’s Progressive 
interpretation of social life, by contrast, unequal, constraining, and 
sometimes devastating economic power was a premise, and only strong and 
deliberate state action could mitigate.  The market was no longer the 
epitome of free society, but instead the basic problem to which government 
power addressed itself.  In rejecting the Progressive vision, Reagan helped 
to reinstate libertarian premises in the definition of policy problems and 
their potential resolutions. 
The picture of civic dignity that presidential popular constitutionalism 
puts forward also frames policy problems and their perceived solutions.  
Ecological enablement suggests the importance of empowering, or at least 
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protective social policies in maintaining the equal status of citizens.  
(Consider the place of Social Security in electoral politics today as a 
persistent instance of this connection.)  Constitutional faith makes equal 
liberty a touchstone in the identity of each citizen who identifies with it, and 
enables a sense of personal affront at, for instance, racial classification 
(however understood) or interference with speech.  The strong premise of 
self-mastery that Reagan helped to restore, by contrast, casts suspicion on 
regulation and safety-net policies as being not just inefficacious, but 
corrosive of a certain kind of civic spirit—in a phrase, un-American.  A 
theory of legitimate government, inasmuch as it is part of a constitutional 
vision of the kind under discussion here, will take much of its shape from 
these other variables:  the framing of problems and solutions in a normative 
social vision and the picture of moral imperatives in versions of civic 
dignity. 
This is not, of course, to say that rhetoric or ideas could ever be the main 
or only cause of a policy program’s success.  The dynamic interaction 
between the two domains means that successful policies lend support to the 
constitutional vision with which they are associated, while visions 
connected with programs seen to fail will be weakened accordingly.  Both 
Nixon and Reagan addressed a perception that many mid-century policies 
had grown burdensome and ineffective.  By the same token, they helped to 
create a normative social vision in which such policies would have the 
suspicion of failure around them axiomatically. 
B.  The Topical Scope of Constitutionalism 
Many scholars have sought ways of understanding the Constitution’s 
relation to economic justice and so-called social rights.137  Some have 
concentrated on institutional competence, arguing that courts have good 
reason not to create and enforce such rights, but that legislative 
commitments of major scope take on constitutional dimensions that courts 
might accordingly enforce for consistency at the margin.138  Others have 
considered the popular currency of economic and social constitutionalism, 
examining the use of Thirteenth Amendment principles and other claims to 
economic liberty and/or equality in debates well outside the courts, such as 
in labor-union politics.139  Some have examined the language of legislative 
debates on major social commitments as instances of constitutional 
interpretation within the political process.140  Bruce Ackerman, in 
considering the constitutional status of the New Deal, has placed particular 
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emphasis on presidential leadership in non–Article V constitutional 
amendments.141 
Attention to presidential popular constitutionalism complements these 
approaches to the question.  Presidential articulation of constitutional vision 
has been essential in legitimating major legislative acts on social and 
economic rights, tying them to normative social vision and images of 
dignity in a way that the diffuse activity of legislative debate is much less 
likely to do.  Particularly since Wilson’s turn, linking presidential 
interpretive authority to democratic activity, the President has played a 
unique role in giving voice to the fabric of constitutional presuppositions in 
which such legislative measures find their significance. 
C.  The Importance of Rhetoric 
It was a defining debate of the 2008 presidential campaign whether 
language matters or is simply window dressing for what really counts:  
substantive policy commitments and clashes of interest groups.142  This 
political question, as it happens, corresponds to a question in legal and 
political-science scholarship:  whether language is best regarded as tactical 
or as something distinct—an effort to communicate genuinely and create a 
field of common understanding.143  Without trying to solve basic questions 
in the philosophy of language or the theory of action, this Article 
illuminates one setting in which language operates in a way that, while 
plainly strategic and essentially linked to the operation of power, is also 
much more than merely tactical. 
If tactical rhetoric can be understood as taking for granted existing 
alignments of interests and power and seeking advantage on their margins, 
the rhetoric of presidential popular constitutionalism is its opposite.  It 
seeks to create and reinforce the distribution of interests by appealing to 
listeners’ sense of where their dignity resides and which aspects of their 
material situations are most salient as bases for political and social 
demands.  It also works to revise the normative premises—rules, standards, 
and norms—against whose background tactical action proceeds.  It thus 
addresses the scope of what listeners believe they are entitled to demand, 
what can correspondingly be demanded of them, and, indeed, what politics 
can and cannot accomplish. 
None of this denies the significance of tactics, but it does deny their 
comprehensiveness.  All political action takes place in a world already 
interpreted—an imagined community, to borrow a phrase.  Presidential 
 
 141. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
 142. See, e.g., Aswini Anburajan, Obama Jabs at Clinton’s “False Hope” Claims, 
FIRSTREAD, Jan. 6, 2008, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/01/06/554337.aspx. 
 143. For a discussion of the debate in political theory, see, for example, Daniel A. Farber 
& Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:  Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 
(1992).  For the philosophical issue, see 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:  REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 1–142 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981). 
PURDY FOR BP 3/2/2009  7:02:06 AM 
1870 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
popular constitutionalism is one of the foremost ways that the interpretive 
presuppositions of that community are created and reworked.  On reflection, 
this is not at all surprising.  The twin sources of legitimacy in American 
political culture are constitutional principle and democratic will, principles 
of notoriously awkward and sometimes paradoxical fit.144  Presidents’ 
accounts of the ethos and basic commitments of the constitutional 
community, particularly when delivered at the close of an election cycle and 
a change of administration, are one point of convergence, in which 
democratic will changes or confirms popular-constitutional principles even 
as its spokesperson anchors the electoral decision in deeper and more 
lasting commitments. 
CONCLUSION 
Presidential rhetoric forms a part of American political practice that is 
essential to any adequate understanding of “popular constitutionalism.”  
Presidential language provides normative pictures of social life and the 
national community, connects these with dignity and purpose in the minds 
and lives of listeners, and creates theories of political authority and 
legitimacy out of these elements.  Although presidential popular 
constitutionalism dates to the earliest years of American politics, it became 
truly “popular” with the transformation of the President’s rhetorical and 
interpretive role under Woodrow Wilson, who linked the independence and 
authority of the office directly to its electoral mandate and capacity to 
address the people in a single voice.  Wilson also initiated a Progressive 
version of presidential popular constitutionalism, which produced a robust 
image of legitimate government as the only adequate defender of vulnerable 
individuals in a complex social order.  That language, however, 
encountered difficulty in maintaining a persuasive view of civic dignity, 
and partly for that reason it gave way to a much-diminished account of 
legitimate government and a normative social vision that is, by turn, 
libertarian (Reagan) and communitarian (Clinton and George W. Bush).  
We remain, half-unknowingly, adrift in that constitutional vision. 
Those who seek a more robust account of government’s role will need to 
pick up old rhetorical tasks in a manner that takes on the new circumstances 
of individuality, diversity, consumerism, and the centrality of markets to the 
political imagination.  They will need a normative social vision and register 
of dignity that can integrate these considerations with a view of the 
distinctive capacities of government.  They will need to put this rhetorical 
vision in dynamic interaction with a set of policies that give it concrete life.  
And, first, they will have to acknowledge that presidential language is not 
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just cheap talk, but matters to the political community’s understanding of 
the appropriate, the necessary, and the possible. 
 
